We show that the information-theoretic maximum entropy (MaxEnt) approach to deriving the canonical ensemble theory is mathematically equivalent to the classic approach of Boltzmann, Gibbs and Darwin-Fowler. The two approaches, however, "interpret" a same mathematical theorem differently; most notably observing mean-energy in the former and energy conservation in the latter. However, applying the same MaxEnt method to the grand canonical ensemble fails, while the correct statistics is obtained if one carefully follows the classic approach based on Boltzmann's microcanonical equal probability a priori. One does not need to invoke quantum mechanics, and there is no Gibbs paradox. MaxEnt and related minimum relative entropy principle are based on the mathematical theorem concerning large deviations of rare fluctuations. As a scientific method, it requires classical mechanics or other assumptions to provide meaningful prior distributions for the expected-value based statistical inference. A naive assumption of uniform prior is not valid in statistical mechanics.
The first condition enforces normalization; the second one is interpreted as "conditioned on observing the mean value for h(·)". We shall call p m the prior. The form of p * m is exactly the same as that derived through minimizing the relative entropy
under the constraints given in (2) . It is important to point out that MaxEnt is really the minimum relative entropy with uniform prior. This theorem is concerned with the conditional distribution of a collection of individual samples, given that some quantity averaged over the large number of individual samples shows highly unlikely behavior. Note that if the observed sample mean is the expected value of the prior, then λ 0 = λ 1 = 0. This theorem is closely related to the large deviation theory of empirical distribution (i.e., histogram)
where the delta function δ {Xi=ωm} = 1 if X i = ω m ; and zero otherwise. According to the strong law of large number in probability theory, we know that this empirical distribution converges to the prior distribution {p m } of X i . Moreover, the level-2 Sanov theorem in large deviation theory [12, 14] states that for any set C of probability distribution, we have
where
is the relative entropy of µ with respect to the prior distribution p i . Therefore, the relative entropy can be interpreted as the "free energy" of deviation in the sense of a distribution [15] . And at this juncture, the two free energies, one from the theory of large deviation and one in the theory of Markov dynamics [16] , agree.
If we set C = {µ : h(·) µ = α} as the space of probability distribution with given constraints, then for any give distribution µ,
unless µ = µ * where µ * satisfies I(µ * ) = inf µ∈C {I(µ)}, i.e. with minimum relative entropy. It is implied that the empirical distribution L n is dominated by µ * when n → ∞. Furthermore, since the distributions of different X i under the constraint 1 n n i=1 h(X i ) = α are identical, the limiting distribution µ * for L n also holds for each X i . If one assumes uniform prior distribution in the canonical ensemble due to ignorance and constrains based on the observed mean energy h(·), then the posterior distribution h(X i ) is just the exponential, canonical distribution. On the other hand, Jaynes [1] argued that the entropy of statistical mechanics and the entropy in information theory are principally the same thing, and simply maximizing the entropy
under some constraint on the mean observations would give the correct canonical distribution. Hence such an optimizing argument is mathematically equivalent to the previous theorem, and consequently statistical mechanics could be re-interpreted as a particular application of a general theory of logical inference and information theory [17] . While Jaynes' approach to statistical mechanics, as well as the widely-used minimum relative entropy principle in information theory, is based on observations of mean-energy, the classic approach of Boltzmann, Gibbs and Darwin-Fowler to statistical mechanics interprets the same theorem differently. For the canonical ensemble, suppose it is a part of a larger microcanonical ensemble consisting of N closed, identical canonical ensembles. Let X i represent the microstate of the i-th canonical ensemble, say momenta and positions (p, q). Then the high dimensional vector X = (X 1 , X 2 , ..., X N ) represents a microstate in the microcannonical ensemble. Let the function e(X i ) be the energy of the i-th canonical ensemble, and the total energy E tot = N i=1 e(X i ). The law of classical mechanical energy conservation says the X is only confined in the subspace {E tot = H} where H is the given total energy of the larger microcanonical ensemble. The notion of equal a priori probability further assumes that the probability of X is equally distributed on such a subspace [18] . The marginal distribution of each X i is then exponentially dependent on e(X i ) when N tends to infinity. Boltzmann's most probable state method and DarwinFowler's steepest descent method are all based on such a setup and are mathematically equivalent [19] . Note that Boltzmann, Gibbs and Darwin-Fowler deal with the convergence of empirical distributions as in Eq. (5) rather than marginal distribution as in the theorem (1). However, when N tends to infinity, the limiting empirical distribution is the same as the limiting marginal distribution.
The distribution for the high-dimensional microstate X in Boltzmann's approach, subjected to the energy conservation E tot = H, is exactly the same as that of the MaxEnt approach conditioned on observing {e = H/N }. Hence they are mathematically equivalent. However, subtle differences exist in their interpretations: For the MaxEnt approach, one must first assume the existence of a prior distribution for the canonical ensemble even without a constraint on the mean energy. In the classic approach, the equal a priori probability of the entire microcanonical ensemble can be verified from such a uniform prior distribution of the independent subsystems without any constraint in the MaxEnt principle. That is why Jaynes called this framework "subjective thermodynamics" [1] .
However, the reasnoning behind using a uniform prior distribution as the most suitable one when one knows nothing of any random variable is only empirical, and one must be very careful when applying it to a specific scientific problem. For example, if one only knows the mean particle number in a grand-canonical ensemble, this principle would conclude that the particle number distribution is likewise exponential (i.e., geometric). But the experimentally observed distribution is Poissonian when the particle is nearly independent, whether distinguishable or not (see below for detailed discussion). Hence only justifying the form of the energy distribution in the canonical ensemble is not a sufficient proof for the validity of the MaxEnt principle as substitute for the classical statistic mechanics. In other words, the maximum entropy or minimum relative entropy principle, by itself, can never tell you the prior distribution. The prior distribution has to be supplied by the specific problem to which the principle is applied. Of course, for the purpose of data analysis exclusively, this technique could be quite useful in supplying a minimal model maximizing the degree of freedoms beyond the given constraints [20] .
Professional statisticians would also use other methods to test the uniform prior hypothesis after the analysis of the data. Now the central question arises: What are exactly the prior distributions of energy and particle number for the grand-canonical ensemble? Gibbs tried to answer this question more than one hundred years ago, starting from the equal probability priori. His derivation for energy fluctuation was highly successful, but for the grandcanonical ensemble with fluctuating particle numbers, a difficulty known as Gibbs paradox arises: Whether or not the phase space volume φ(E, v, n) = d 3n q d 3n p used in grand-canonical ensemble should be divided by n!. It is now understood that for microcanonical or canonical ensembles, both with fixed particle number, the paradox is not a well-defined problem [22] .
Similar to the deviation for canonical ensembles, and still suppose a large microcanonical ensemble with total energy, volume and particle number invariant. The box further consists of N open, identical small grandcanonical ensembles each with fixed volume v and mean particle number n . They are statistically identical but not rigorously independent. The phase-space uniformity states that the high-dimensional microstate space consists of all the N n particles in the large box uniformly distributed in position and momentum [18] , and ask what is the distribution of particle numbers within a small grand-canonical ensemble. Hence the natural methodology is to calculate the number of high-dimensional microstates corresponding to a given energy E and particle numbers n in a grand-canonical volume. This number of high-dimensional microstates would give the weight (probability) of such a microstate in the smaller subsystem. The relation between a small subsystem and the rest of the "reservoir" is a rather subtle issue, which has been repeatedly emphasized in statistical physics.
Textbooks [21] often proceed in the same manner as in the treatment of the canonical ensemble through Boltzmann's most probable distribution method. This is a little misleading. The key to this problem lies on how to go about reconstructing the high-dimensional microstate from those low-dimensional microstates for each subsystem. There is no problem for the canonical ensemble, since one can obtain the high-dimensional microstate simply from linking all the microstates of each subsystem together. However, in the case of distinguishable particles, we must take into account the partition of all N n particles into the N identical subsystems for the grand canonical ensemble. Let m i be the number of grand canonical ensembles whose microstates containing n i particles with energy E i . Hence, for any possible distribution {m i } of the microstates in grand canonical ensembles, there are two kinds of partitions: one is a partition of these occupation numbers {m i } into a total of N subsystems; the other is the partition of all the N n particles (i.e. labeling particles) into the possible set {n i }. The canonical ensemble only deals with the former, and in textbooks, for grand canonical ensembles, they also only consider the former one, while the factorial n! comes from the latter partition of particles [22, 23] .
Hence, the number of all high-dimensional microstates corresponding to {m i } is given by
subject to the three constrains:
which could be maximized to derive the correct statistics of grand canonical ensembles. For indistinguishable particles, the weight for each high-dimensional microstate in the large microcanonical ensemble is already different from the distinguishable case and the factorial naturally arises due consideration of the phase space volume. Hence it is well-known that although the n! would not appear because of the partition of particles into small subsystems, it would emerge from the phase space volume in this case. Therefore, Gibbs paradox is definitely not related to quantum mechanics, and the partition function for grand-canonical ensemble should be written as
where Q(E, v, n) is the partition function for the canonical ensemble. For independent distinguishable particles, one could understand the n! from another perspective. Due to the phase space uniformity assumption, the position distribution for each particle is uniformly distributed in this large system with total volume N v. Then at a certain time, the probability for each particle belonging to a specific subsystem is 1 N . Notice that the total number of particle is N n , hence the distribution of the particle number in this subsystem is Binomial with parameter (N n , 1 N ). When n is fixed and N tends to infinity, it converges to a Poisson distribution with mean n . The factorial just comes out from the expression of the Poisson distribution
where λ = n . This is known as Poisson statistics for a point process, which has been experimentally verified in number fluctuation measurement based on fluorescence correlation spectroscopy (FCS) [24] . Furthermore, when N tends to infinity, the positions of the particles must converge to the well-known Poisson point process and the number of particles within a certain space is just its counting process. Let us now come back to the maximum entropy or minimum relative entropy principle. It is worth noticing that the phase space uniformity is of course another form of maximum entropy for the microcanonical ensemble without any additional constraint [18] but is different from Jaynes' framework. There is even confusionregarding the fact that the derivation of the canonical ensemble distribution by Darwin-Fowler is an application of maximum entropy approach. This is not the case. Althouth they are based on same mathematical theorem, they are definitely different interpretations. What Darwin-Fowler did was to derive the distribution of the subsystem from the whole phase space uniformity assumption [19] . They did not mention anything like the uniform prior distribution of the subsystem. The most important element in Darwin-Fowler's interpretation is still the role of conservation of energy at the level of a whole, isolated system, the First Law of Thermodynamics. They actually justified a special version of the law of large number in the empirical distribution space for canonical ensemble, and finally got the limiting distribution which was exactly Boltzmann's most probable state [19] . We clarify a confusion regarding their terminology. The "mean" in their work is just the mean occupation number of each microstate of the subsystem, which is exactly the probability rather than the real mean of the fluctuating energy.
Jaynes' information approach to classical mechanics is a method of statistical inference based on macroscopic observables, i.e., expected values, in contrast to main stream statistics whose inferences are often based on samples. In both approaches, a prior in the absence of any measurement can only be subjective. In the present paper, we have shown that the Principle of Maximum Entropy can not fully replace the classical BoltzmannGibbs statistical mechanics precisely because the latter built their "prior" based on (1) uniformity in Newtonian mechanical phase space, and (2) conservation of energy, number, etc. These two assumptions are fundamentally outside any logical inference approach. The case in point is the grand canonical ensemble: mechanical phase space uniformity necessarily leads to a Poisson distribution as the prior for the number distribution of independent classical particles in an infinitesimal open box.
L. Szilard and B. Mandelbrot also advanced another line of interpretation for classical thermodynamics, called purely phenomenological theory, based on the theory of sufficient statistics [2, 3] . Interestingly, it is also based on the above mentioned mathematical theorem, and it asserts that all the macroscopic thermodynamic quantities are exactly the sufficient statistics of their microscopic fluctuations. The theory gives the correct distribution when a given ensemble has been perturbed but the new system still has the conservation law. It implies that all of the distributions in statistical mechanics must belong to the exponential family of probability distributions [25] .
In the present study, we clarified E.T. Jaynes' MaxEnt approach to the statistical thermodynamic based on information theory, and its relation to classical statistical mechanics. It is found that correctly determining a prior distribution is the central issue, which could not be addressed in general from only information theory or statistical inference. Of course, as a mathematical theory, the theorem of minimum relative entropy could be applied everywhere and not just be confined to mechanics or physics. It justifies the diverse use of "statistical mechanics", and explains why it works as a fundamental tool in information theory. More importantly, the mathematical theorem also tells us that the concepts of entropy and relative entropy are both mathematical constructions, both of which naturally arise in the asymptotic probability of large deviations [14] .
It is arguable that information theory, at least in its mathematical presentation, is a statistical theory endowed with the concept of entropy. This perspective naturally resolves a nagging issue that troubles "information" as a more general theoretic concept: The relation between information and knowledge [26] . It is well understood that thermodynamics is about what is impossible (for macroscopic systems) and what is very unlikely. It provides constraints on molecular processes, but it cannot specify their mechanisms. Knowledge is ultimately in the mechanism. There seems to be a contradistinction between "statistics" and "knowledge."
There is another, dynamic origin of the concept of entropy and relative entropy (or free energy). It has been shown recently that they are emergent properties of any Markovian processes [16] . The original Shannon's information theory for coding, however, is a static one.
We 
